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Instrument Technical Performance Study Context
Historically, some NASA missions have exceeded schedule and cost commitments. Previous studies 
indicate technical performance is a contributor.
The 1980 NASA Project Management Study concludes, “one of the most significant contributors to 
cost and schedule growth is inadequate definition of technical and management aspects of a 
program…” (cited in GAO/NSIAD-93-97, p.11).
The 1991 NASA Roles and Missions Report identified a “need for increased technological readiness 
and requirements on the front end of a program” (cited in GAO/NSIAD-93-97, p. 11).
The 1992 NASA Program Costs Report stated that NASA officials identified, among other things, 
“insufficient definition studies…” as reasons why initial estimates changed over time (GAO/NSIAD-93-
97, p.11).
The 2002 Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs reviewed national security 
space programs and found “requirements definition and control issues, unhealthy cost bias in 
proposal evaluation, widespread lack of budget reserves required to implement high risk programs 
on schedule,  and an overall underappreciation of the importance of appropriately staffed and 
trained system engineering staffs to manage the technologically demanding and unique aspects of 
space programs” (Task Force Report, 2003, p. i).
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Instrument Technical Performance Study Context (cont)
In 2007, The NASA Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) chartered the NASA Instrument 
Capability Study (NICS).
“to determine whether NASA instrument developers are facing challenges that impact the 
capability to design and build quality instruments or whether there are flaws in the 
acquisition strategy evidenced by schedule delays, cost overruns, and increased technical 
risk via design deficiencies. The … team was also chartered to determine if occurrences 
[are] … isolated cases or if there [are] generic issues … If the issues [are] found to be 
generic, the team [is] to offer solutions to recover such capability.” NICS Report (2008) p. vi
The 2008 NICS Report, led by GSFC, identified challenges to instrument technical 
performance consistent with findings from previous reports. 
In 2018, The Instrument Technical Performance Study was initiated by the Instrument and 
Payload Systems Engineering Branch (IPSE) to determine the current state of Technical 
Performance in GSFC Payload & Instrument Systems Engineering.
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Instrument Technical Performance Study Problem Statement
Historically, some NASA GSFC missions have exceeded schedule and cost commitments. Studies 
indicate technical performance is a contributor. 
Technical Research Questions – programmatic questions are addressed in a separate study
RQ1) Is there a set of proxies that identify behaviors consistent with [payload/instrument] 
technical success? RQ1a) What proxies identify technically successful instruments?
RQ2) Does at least 80% (TBR) of IPSE in-house payload/instrument portfolio meet technical 
success? Technical success is measured as a ratio of data products meeting key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements defined at Mission Preliminary Design Review (MPDR) to mission life (see next slide). 
RQ2a) What is the relationship between IPSE support/approach, and NICS Systems Engineering 
(SE) threads & technical success? (NICS Report SE threads are presented on slide 11) 
RQ3) Is the Center-level investment sufficient for at least 80% (TBR) of the IPSE managed in-house 
payloads/instruments to meet technical success as defined in the Logic Model? Center-level 
investment is defined as existence of IPSE staff and contractors.
RQ4) Is there a relationship between meeting NASA scientific instrument technical success and 
meeting schedule and cost commitments? RQ4a) If yes, what is the relationship?
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Instrument Technical Performance Study Objectives
Desired results – Using the proxies from RQ1) and RQ1a)
• Determine the extent to which IPSE has addressed the lack of critical SE skills and/or expertise 
identified in the NICS report in the areas of instrument development, implementation of unique 
one-of-a-kind high technology development, and requirements formulation.
• Determine if at least 80% (TBR) of the IPSE in-house payload/instrument portfolio meets mission 
preliminary design review (MPDR) key Level2 (TBR) requirements during operations.
• Determine if Center-level investment is sufficient for at least 80% (TBR) of IPSE managed in-house 
payloads/instruments to meet technical success as defined here:
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 = 𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆, 𝑥𝑥, 𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁 , 𝑥𝑥 …
• Determine if there is a relationship between instrument technical success and meeting schedule 
and cost commitments.
Definitions/ methods
• Success is defined as at least 80% (TBR) of instrument/ projects meet technical success measured 
as a ratio of data products meeting key Level 2 (TBR) requirements defined at MPDR to mission life 
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Technical Performance Study Logic Model 14 January 2020
Inputs Activities Outputs
Level 1 Outcomes Level 2 
Outcome Level 1 Outcome SRR MPDR CDR Delivery Commissioning End of Mission
Authority to direct 
personnel to 
cooperate and 
respond to Study.
Access to 
requirements
WYE 
(requirements, 
data collection and 
analysis, survey 
management, 
report generation) 
FTE (allocate 
resources to 
Principal Engineer 
/ Sr. Staff and/or 
other Systems, 
staff to complete 
survey, cooperate 
with study)
Python and 
modules
Adobe Acrobat pro
Survey Monkey
1) Capture data at time 
of SRR, PDR, CDR, 
Delivery, 
Commissioning, and 
end of mission (during 
science operations)
2) Analyze collected 
data using NICS report 
as control/baseline: 
Instruments reported … 
“2/3 of the design and 
performance 
requirements were all or 
mostly defined and 
approved prior to 
PDR… 3/4 of approved 
requirements changed 
after PDR… 1/2 
changed after CDR… 
<1/4 of the requirements 
reviews were very 
helpful … > 1/4 of the 
instruments did not hold 
a requirements review, 
57% did not hold one at 
the instrument 
subsystem level…. 83% 
of the instruments and 
43% of the general 
workforce indicated that 
there were problems 
with requirements 
management. All with 
requirements 
management problems 
had design deficiencies 
that contributed to cost 
growth or schedule 
delays” (pp 52-53) 
3) Generate report(s) 
including presentation-
level summaries 
1) Analyzed data. 
Analyses reflect 
types of data 
collected
2) Reports. 
Reports include 
data summaries, 
visualizations
recommendations 
and presentation-
level summaries 
Start = SRR
O1) Payload/ 
Instrument key 
Level2 (TBR)
requirements 
(including 
mission life) 
are defined at 
SRR  
The output of 
the SRR is the 
starting point 
and is 
measured as 
key Level2 
(TBR)
requirements 
at SRR
Commitment = 
MPDR
O1) At MPDR, 
payload/ 
instrument key 
Level2 (TBR)
requirements 
(including 
mission life) 
have not 
changed from 
SRR
Q1) At MPDR 
have key Level
2 (TBR)
requirements 
(including 
mission life)
changed from 
SRR? If so, 
what are the 
variances? 
Why? 
O1) At CDR payload/ 
instrument key Level 2 
(TBR) requirements 
(including mission life) 
have not changed from 
MPDR
O2) At CDR, payload/ 
instrument key Level2
(TBR) requirements 
(including mission life) 
have not changed from 
SRR
Q1) At CDR have key 
Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including 
mission life) changed from 
MPDR? If so, what are the 
variances? Why? 
Q2) At CDR have key 
Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including 
mission life) changed from 
SRR? If so, what are the 
variances? Why? 
O1) At Delivery 
payload/ instrument key 
Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including 
mission life) have not 
changed from CDR
O2) At Delivery 
payload/ instrument key 
Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including 
mission life) have not 
changed from MPDR
O3) At Delivery 
payload/ instrument key 
Level2 (TBR)
requirements (including 
mission life) have not 
changed from SRR
Q1) At Delivery have 
key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including 
mission life) changed 
from CDR? If so, what 
are the variances? 
Why? 
Q2) At Delivery have 
key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including 
mission life) changed 
from MPDR? If so, what 
are the variances? 
Why? 
Q3) At Delivery have 
key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including 
mission life) changed 
from SRR? If so, what 
are the variances? 
Why? 
O1) At Commissioning payload/ 
instrument key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including mission life) 
have not changed from Delivery
O2) At Commissioning payload/ 
instrument key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including mission life) 
have not changed from MPDR
O3) At Commissioning payload/ 
instrument key Level2 (TBR)
requirements (including mission life) 
have not changed from SRR
Q1) At Commissioning have key 
Level 2 (TBR) requirements 
(including mission life) changed from 
Delivery? If so, what are the 
variances? Why? 
Q2) At Commissioning have key 
Level 2 (TBR) requirements 
(including mission life) changed from 
MPDR? If so, what are the 
variances? Why? 
Q3) At Commissioning have key 
Level 2 (TBR) requirements 
(including mission life)changed from 
SRR? If so, what are the variances? 
Why? 
O1) At End of Mission, payload/  
instrument key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including mission life) 
have not changed from 
Commissioning
O2) At End of Mission, payload/ 
instrument key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including mission life) 
have not changed from MPDR
O3) At End of Mission, payload/ 
instrument key Level2 (TBR)
requirements (including mission life) 
have not changed from SRR
Q1) At End of Mission have payload/  
instrument key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including mission life) 
changed from Commissioning? If so, 
what are the variances? Why? 
Q2) At End of Mission have key Level 
2 (TBR) requirements (including 
mission life) changed from MPDR? If 
so, what are the variances? Why? 
Q3) At End of Mission  have key 
Level 2 (TBR) requirements 
(including mission life)changed from 
SRR? If so, what are the variances? 
Why? 
O1) Individual 
payload/ instrument
key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements 
(including mission 
life) do not change 
from MPDR
Q1) Have individual 
payload/ instrument
key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements 
(including mission 
life) changed from 
MPDR? If so, what 
are the variances? 
Why?  
O1) At least 80% (TBR) of IPSE payload/instrument 
portfolio key Level 2 (TBR) requirements (including 
mission life) do not change from MPDR 
O5) Center-level investment is sufficient for at least
80% (TBR) of the IPSE managed in-house payloads/ 
instruments to meet technical success as defined 
here 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼= 𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆,𝑥𝑥, 𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁 ,𝑥𝑥 …
Q1) Have at least 80% (TBR) of IPSE
payload/instrument portfolio key Level 2 (TBR)
requirements (including mission life) changed from 
MPDR? If so, what action(s) should be taken to 
improve instrument performance?
Q2) Are Center-level resources sufficient for at least 
80% (TBR) of IPSE managed in-house payloads/ 
instrument to meet technical success as defined in 
this logic model? If not, how much more Center 
investment is needed?
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NICS Charter, Objectives,  
Recommendations, Future Steps 
NICS Charter July 2007 – to determine whether
• “NASA instrument developers are facing challenges that impact the 
capability to design and build quality instruments… or …
• flaws in the acquisition strategy [are] evidenced by schedule delays, cost 
overruns, and increased technical risk via design deficiencies.” [and]
• “[Recent] occurrences are coincident, but isolated cases or if … generic 
issues [are] causing this degradation.” NICS Report (2008) p.vi.
NICS team included GSFC (lead), NOAA and DOD (participants)
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NICS Objectives (NICS Report, 2008, p. vi)
• Understand problem areas in instrument development processes 
• Determine problem areas impacting primary success indicators 
(cost, schedule, technical performance) and instrument 
development processes
• Identify potential issues for higher risk or more complex instrument 
developments
• Identify common overarching themes spanning instrument 
development processes
• Recommend solutions
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NICS Approach (NICS Report, 2008, p. vii)
Implemented a top-level assessment of instrument development 
processes and success indicators
• Instruments roughly $10m to greater than $100m
• Time frame 3 to more than 6 years
Used two surveys, cross-referenced with research
• Instrument Survey n = 71 Instrument Managers, 41 instruments
• General Workforce Survey n = 164 invited civil servants &  contractors, 
and volunteer participants from industry & academia 
• Independent research: NASA/ Federal/ RAND publications, lessons 
learned, SpaceNews (NICS Report, 2008, p.60).
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NICS Table 3.3.6-1 Summary of SE Threads (NICS Report, 2008, p.49) 
Theme Thread Rationale
Systems 
Engineering 
(SE)
SE-1 Requirements 
management problems 
Requirements management problems
Requirements or specifications not clearly communicated
Work proceeding at risk ahead of change/waiver approval
Implementation of changes not timely 
SE-2 Requirements 
formulation issues
Insufficient requirements traceability
Goals or desires stated as requirements 
Requirements too complex
Requirements unverifiable
SE-3 Issues with 
requirements changes
Design, requirements or interface changes occurring after PDR
Design, requirements or interface changes occurring after CDR
SE-4 Risk management 
resource issues
Lack of resources to manage risks
Risks not identified regularly
Mitigation plans not developed for all known risks 
SE-5 Review effectiveness Requirements reviews not considered helpful
Objectives not met in requirements reviews
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NICS Finding 1 and Recommended Actions 
Finding 1 Recommended Actions Rationale
1. Implement changes to policy to define and elevate 
instrument management requirements and authorities in a 
manner similar to project-level management.
2. Assign NASA instrument managers full authority and 
responsibility to manage their cost and schedule reserves 
and hold them accountable.
3. Require 30% to 50% cost reserves for instrument 
developments (>$10M) to account for the fact that most 
instrument developments are highly complex, single builds.
4. Require 1-1/2 to 2 months per year of schedule
reserve for instrument developments (>$10M).
5. Require dedicated level of support staff
(configuration management, schedule management, risk 
management and budget management) for instrument 
developments (>$10M). 
Instrument developments are uniquely complex, often one-
of-a-kind, and, as such, require a higher level of visibility, 
authority, and support than normal spacecraft subsystems.
Transition of authority to the lower levels is necessary to 
permit informed management and mitigation of risks before 
they turn into more expensive problems.
The typical rule of thumb of 25% cost reserve and 1 month 
per year schedule reserve does not appear to be sufficient 
for instrument developments. This is corroborated by the 
data which indicated that ~70% of the instruments reported 
25% or more cost overruns and ~60% of the instruments 
reported schedule delays of 5 months or more.
Finding 1: Instrument developments lack resources and authority to successfully manage to 
cost and schedule requirements  (NICS Report, 2008, p.51)
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NICS Finding 2 and Recommended Actions 
Finding 2 Recommended Actions Rationale
1. Expedite the planned enhancement of the NASA 
Engineering Network People, Organization, Project, Skills 
(POPS) expertise locator to enable
instruments to address critical skills shortages by
drawing upon personnel from other NASA centers.
2. Add capability to the POPS locator to include data 
sources external to the NASA workforce.
3. Require the addition of a deputy instrument
manager position (similar to a deputy project
manager), for instrument developments with a
budget >$10M. 
Expediting the POPS expertise locator enhancement will 
allow instrument projects to locate critical skills in the near-
term mitigating staffing issues, which is one of the top five 
problems reported in this Study. POPS allows instruments to 
draw from a wider pool of potential expertise.
Given the complexity and scope of instrument 
developments, the addition of a deputy instrument manager 
position is warranted. This position creates a mechanism for 
transfer of corporate knowledge, training and mentoring, 
and provides critical support to the instrument manager. 
Finally, it ensures continuity, should leadership transitions 
occur. 
Finding 2: Instrument developments lack critical skills, expertise or leadership to successfully 
implement these unique (one-of-a-kind) high technology developments (NICS Report, 2008, p.52)
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NICS Finding 3 and Recommended Actions 
Finding 3 Recommended Actions Rationale
1. Require NASA instrument team leadership to take 
requirements formulation/management training, e.g., 
“Requirements Development and Management (APPEL-
REQ)”, prior to requirements development.
2. Require instrument teams to conduct Peer Reviews of 
requirements (for each instrument subsystem), in 
preparation for instrument SRRs.
3. Require draft mission Level 1 and 2 technical 
requirements to be controlled and provided to instrument 
managers prior to the instrument SRR. Also, notify 
instrument managers of any changes to the draft 
requirements so that impact assessments can be 
performed. 
In order to fix the requirements problems reported in the 
Study, a wide range of recommendations should be 
implemented. These recommendations include a greater 
emphasis on training to provide instrument teams a better 
understanding of how to formulate and manage 
requirements. The recommendations also provide an 
improved requirements review process to account for the 
fact that instrument SRRs occur much earlier than mission 
SRRs which often leads to requirements changes, as well as 
traceability issues. Finally, a recommendation is added to 
provide instruments with top level requirements early in 
formulation to allow for a more thorough requirements 
development and management process. 
Finding 3: There are significant process problems in the area of requirements formulation, 
reviews, and management (NICS Report, 2008, pp.52-53)
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NICS Finding 4 and Recommended Actions 
Finding 4 Recommended Actions Rationale
1. Develop an Agency-level historical cost and schedule 
database of instruments to provide information that would 
allow for higher fidelity cost caps.
2. Review cost credibility evaluation and scoring criteria for 
accuracy and flow-down to the proposal selection process 
(for use by Technical Management and Cost (TMC) or 
project Source Evaluation Board (SEB)).
3. Establish a Peer Review prior to PDR for instruments 
>$10M to assess budget and schedule baseline credibility 
and increase the emphasis on cost and schedule assessment 
at PDR.
4. Ensure that instrument managers are made aware of 
externally driven changes in a timely manner and afforded 
the opportunity to discuss any impacts prior to 
implementation of changes. 
The costing database will be useful in: establishing higher 
fidelity cost caps; evaluating government and contractor 
instrument proposals; and assessing progress during 
implementation. Furthermore, a data exchange between 
NASA, NOAA, and DoD on instrument development cost data 
would allow for a more thorough data set.  
Improved cost credibility criteria support a more robust and 
thorough source selection. 
Adding a budget and schedule baseline credibility Peer 
Review prior to PDR will increase confidence going in to the 
Confirmation Review. 
Early communication of externally driven changes (e.g., 
budget or schedule changes) down to the instrument level 
minimizes the impact to the instrument development. 
Finding 4: Unrealistic caps, overly optimistic estimating, externally directed changes correspond to 
a significant increase in the likelihood of overrunning cost, schedule (NICS Report,2008, pp.53-54)
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NICS Finding 5 and Recommended Actions 
Finding 5 Recommended Actions Rationale
1. Require all instrument managers to take the survey upon 
delivery of their instrument.
2. Maintain survey results in a historical database. 
The aggregated data could provide the Agency information 
regarding trends, persistent issues, and emerging issues. 
Finding 5: NASA needs a method to continue answering basic questions pertaining to instrument 
development process to identify any emerging or persistent issues (NICS Report, 2008, p.54)
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